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Abstract
We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neu-
ral activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six
prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play
a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscil-
lations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscil-
lations help to establish a communication channel between sender and
receiver, or are causally involved in triggering a representation) and
properly representational (when oscillations are a constitutive part of
the representation).
We show that even an idealized informational sender-receiver ac-
count of representation makes the representational status of oscilla-
tions a non-trivial matter, which depends on rather minute empirical
details.
1 Introduction
A foundational hypothesis in cognitive science is that cognition progresses
through the manipulation of representations: entities that are about, or stand
for, other, generally extra-mental entities (Frankish and Ramsey 2012). Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, information about the external world flows through
the brain, encoded somehow in its states, modulating behavior in increasingly
sophisticated ways. Much cognitive science aims at identifying those brain
states, and uncovering their content—what it is that they say about the exter-
nal world. In its turn, one of the central research programs in the philosophy
of cognitive science aims at formulating a metaphysics of representations:
what needs to be the case for a certain vehicle to qualify as a representa-
tional state? What determines its representational content? (Cummins 1991;
Ramsey 2007; Shea 2018)
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The paragraph above is written in the abstract way characteristic of philo-
sophical discussion on representations (e.g. Fodor 1974; Pylyshyn 1984); one
that glosses over particular details of implementation. For example, philoso-
phers often use the term ‘vehicle’ with the intention that it range over all
possibly representational brain states (say, single neurons, populations of neu-
rons, or neurotransmitter discharges) and all possible encodings (say, rate-
or phase-based). Studying the metaphysics of representation in such non-
committal terms is methodologically smart: it allows the resulting theory to
apply to vehicles in general, and to capture whatever is common to all in-
stances of representation in the brain. On the other hand, this approach tends
to neglect the particular way in which representations are implemented, and
the keys those particular ways might hold to the more general question of
representation—apart from their intrinsic theoretical interest (Craver 2007;
Boone and Piccinini 2016).
In this paper we redress this situation with respect to one very interesting,
philosophically underexplored kind of vehicle. Frequently, brain activity is or-
ganized into synchronous, quasi-periodic patterns of activation which appear
to contribute to many aspects of cognition, from pre-attentional grouping
(Jensen, Kaiser, and Lachaux 2007; Zion Golumbic et al. 2013; Fries 2015;
Pritchett et al. 2015) to the construction and modification of spatial maps in
the hippocampus (Skaggs et al. 1996; Colgin et al. 2004). The question that
will interest us here is whether these contributions are representational: do
synchronous, periodic patterns of activity (we will call them ‘neural oscilla-
tions’, for brevity) in and of themselves constitute representations?
Investigation of these implementational details is not only interesting in
its own right; it can also help philosophers reach conclusions about represen-
tation in general. In particular, the results of this paper can be used as a
response to the ‘trivialization’ objection against naturalistic theories of con-
tent: many theorists have recently argued that theories that try to explain
the notion of ‘representation’ in terms of functions, information, or causal re-
lations (for example, teleosemantic approaches) are too liberal. According to
this complain, if representational status merely depended on the presence of
these features, almost any brain event would qualify as such (Ramsey 2007;
Burge 2010; Schulte 2017; Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017; Butlin 2018;
Williams and Colling 2018). This outcome would trivialize the notion of ‘rep-
resentation’ and would put its explanatory role into question. Partly for this
reason, some of these theorists suggest that attribution of representational
status should be restricted to relatively sophisticated processes, such as those
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involving map-like structures or constancy mechanisms.
Neural oscillations show this to be a hasty conclusion: as we will see, under
an understanding of representations that would certainly count as liberal
by those theorists’ lights, some forms of simple oscillatory processes qualify
as representational, whereas others do not. “Liberal” naturalistic theories of
content can draw a meaningful, non-trivial distinction between brain events
that are genuinely representational and those that are not.
Our paper is structured in six main sections. In section 2 we sketch our
preferred general approach to the question of the metaphysics of representa-
tion. Our aim in this section is not to offer a fully developed metasemantics
but, rather, to identify a common core to which many theorists working on
this topic adhere. This common core will be enough to distinguish two roles
neural oscillations can play, in the process of generating representations: we
call them enabling and properly representational. We present these roles in
section 3. The following two sections consider some scientifically prominent
cases of brain function, with the goal of ascertaining which one, if any, of
these roles neural oscillations play in them: section 4 discusses neural oscilla-
tions that probably play an enabling role; and section 5 deals with what, we
argue, are the properly representational cases. This taxonomy exemplifies a
second lesson about the usefulness of investigating particular details of imple-
mentation for the study of representations in general: while we have arrived
at it from the consideration of rather minute such details, it is not unreason-
able to think that it will prove helpful in the investigation and description of
many other, unrelated representational phenomena. Section 6 wraps up and
offers some conclusions.
2 The core metaphysics of content
In subsequent sections we will ask of certain kinds of brain activity whether
they count or not as representations. In order to answer this question, we
need a theory of what makes a certain state representational. A substantial
discussion of this question is well beyond the scope of this paper; instead,
we will present, without argument, two tenets that are widely (though by no
means universally) thought to be part of what it is for a representation to be
a representation. These tenets are most closely related with so-called teleose-
mantic naturalistic metasemantics (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987; Neander
2017) but they also draw from the partially overlapping signaling games
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framework (Skyrms 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2014).
The first tenet is that all representational systems share an architectural
motif: in all of them, representational vehicles, or ‘signals’, mediate between
a mechanism producing the representation (called ‘sender’ or ‘producer’) and
a mechanism using the representation (‘receiver’ or ‘consumer’). For a mech-
anism to qualify as a sender or a receiver, it needs to have the right sort of
biological function: the sender’s function is, roughly, to emit the above me-
diating signals when certain states of affairs obtains, whereas the receiver’s
functions is, roughly, to act in certain ways upon reception of the signal.
The content of the representation will be fixed, among other things, by
the relation it bears to the behavior of the producer/sender and the con-
sumer/receiver. Although the specification of these relations vary from ac-
count to account, information generated in the external world flowing from
producer to the representation, and from the representation to the consumer,
is usually taken to play a role: under a first approximation, contents are fixed
by the information that representations carry about the world, under some
designated set of optimal conditions. What these optimal conditions amount
to is somehow fixed by the receiver/consumer’s biological function—this is
the second tenet.
Putting these two ideas together, our metasemantic sketch says that a
certain mental vehicle, V, is a representation if:
1. V is an intermediate state in a sender-receiver architecture, and
2. V helps fulfil its consumer/receiver’s biological function by carrying the
information that the state of affairs S is the case (information which
has flown to V through its producer/sender)
In such a situation, moreover, we may say that the content of V is that
S is the case. In this paper, though, our main focus will be on establish-
ing that certain neural oscillations are representations, and not so much on
ascertaining their content.
This metasemantic sketch is heavily simplified—Ruth Millikan, and many
other theorists after her, have been developing related ideas for the best part
of four decades. Still, it is detailed enough to accommodate a number of
properties that many associate with, or even take to be necessary for, the ex-
istence of representations. First, the possibility of erroneous representation,
or misrepresentation: this will happen, among other things, in some cases
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of sender malfunction, the possibility of which is part and parcel of its hav-
ing a biological function. Second, the fact that representations ought to be
action-guiding—or, at least, somehow contribute to the production of behav-
ior: this will fall out of understanding biological functions as contributions
to the subsistence of the individual (Mossio, Saborido, and Moreno 2009)
or contributions to selection for the functional device in question (Millikan
2002). From section 4 onwards we will rely on these ideas in our discussion
of the representational status of oscillations. Before that, we will briefly dis-
tinguish two possible degrees of involvement for oscillations to have in the
generation of representations.
3 Enabling and representational roles
The taxonomy we are about to present is not a theoretical assumption, but
one of the results of the present investigation: after having surveyed many
of the relevant empirical cases, it is the classification that suggests itself as
most conducive to understanding and organizing the involvement of neu-
ral oscillations in the generation of representations. In any event, of course,
other useful taxonomies are certainly possible, and our preferred one does
not aim at being exhaustive. The two roles under which we will classify the
involvement of neural oscillations in representational phenomena are:
Enabling: Neural oscillations enable or trigger the activation of a represen-
tation.
Representational: Neural oscillations properly are (or are a constitutive
part of) a representation.
First of all, neural oscillations play an enabling role when their main job
is to help set up the communication channel between sender and receiver.
To see what this means, we first note that a sender-receiver configuration
is just a point-to-point information-processing pipeline in the Shannonian
tradition (Shannon 1948; El Gamal and Kim 2011, section 3.1). Compare
the entirely analogous figures 1 and 2. The sender/producer can be thought
of as well as an encoder, and the receiver/consumer as a decoder. Efficient
encoding/decoding is useful in order to get relevant information through in-
herently noisy, limited-capacity channels, and some of the time it is coding-
related roles that neural oscillations will play: for example, oscillations can
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help communicate to the encoder/decoder what is the task-relevant informa-
tion they should focus on communicating (this is related to what information
theorists call a distortion measure—see Martínez (2019) for details). This is
our interpretation of the phenomena discussed in Subsection 4.1. They can
also constitute the mechanism that allows the brain to move from reading
representations to writing them, and back (Subsection 4.2). A third kind of
enabling role is to help build a representation, without being a proper part
of it (Subsection 4.3). There are probably many other purely representation-
enabling roles that neural oscillation can play.
Source Encoder Channel Decoder
original message
M
signal signal decoded message
M̂
Figure 1: A point-to-point information-processing pipeline
World Sender Messages Receiver
state act
Figure 2: A sender-receiver model
The job of neural oscillations, however, is not limited to facilitating (or
disrupting) communication. Sometimes they seem to play a bona fide repre-
sentational role. In other words, they are a constitutive part of the vehicle
of communication—of the signals in figure 1. Neural oscillations not only
enable the flow of information, but also convey information themselves. In
Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 we discuss two cases in which oscillatory phenom-
ena not just enable but are representations. Finally, in Subsection 5.3 we
take a step back and canvass the general role that oscillations play in the




In this section we review cases in which oscillations provide background con-
ditions for representations to exist, or are causally involved in the tokening
of representations, without being themselves representational.
4.1 Attention and Communication Through Coherence
Attention is a kind of modulation of sensory processing, whereby incom-
ing stimuli are preferentially processed, or ignored, based on their current
saliency, or behavioral relevance to the perceiver (Treue 2001; Gilbert and Li
2013). Attentional influence helps target finite and expensive computational
resources in higher cognition to the treatment of those aspects of the incom-
ing sensory stream that most directly affect the perceiver. “As a consequence
the perceptual quality of a visual stimulus located within an attended region
is improved . . . at the expense of the perceptual quality of stimuli located
elsewhere . . . ” (Chalk et al. 2010, p. 114).
Attentional influence on sensory processing has been demonstrated to
exist as early on as V1 (Posner and Gilbert 1999) but probably not earlier
than that (Alilović et al. 2019); this influence increases as we move on to
higher visual areas (Maunsell and Cook 2002) although “the magnitude of
attentional effects depends on the nature of the task and the configuration
of the stimulus” (Gilbert and Li 2013, p. 352).
Spatial attention is often directed to concrete spatial areas in the visual
field. The once ubiquitous metaphor was that attention is like a ‘spotlight’: it
illuminates the attended area and singles it out for further processing (Bre-
fczynski and DeYoe 1999; Hurlbert and Poggio 1985) More recent research
has uncovered some limitations of this spotlight metaphor. First, the spatial
resolution of neurons decreases as we go up in the visual processing hier-
archy (that is, the receptive field size of these neurons increases, Dumoulin
and Wandell 2008): the higher the visual area, the bigger chunks of the visual
fields particular neurons are affected to. This makes intuitive sense: these neu-
rons are often, though not always, attuned to global properties of the visual
scene—to its gist; and not so much to fine-grained details, say, of texture or
color. This means that attention cannot be just a matter of upstream neurons
specializing on (directing a spotlight to) smaller, spotlight-sized, visual-field
regions. Furthermore, the existence of attentional mechanisms that target
objects and features, and not spatial regions, has been amply demonstrated
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(Maunsell and Treue 2006; O’Craven, Downing, and Kanwisher 1999; Treue
and Trujillo 1999). Attentional mechanisms, therefore, somehow are able to
single out, from the whole input to a neuron’s receptive field, a relevant
subset of activity for further treatment.
One of the most widely accepted hypothesis as to how attention ac-
complishes this, Pascal Fries’s communication through coherence (also CTC
henceforth, Fries 2005, 2015), relies on synchronized1 oscillations in the gamma
band (or gamma oscillation, for short, Pritchett et al. 2015; Jensen, Kaiser,
and Lachaux 2007; Fell et al. 2003; Zion Golumbic et al. 2013; Fries 2009). In
this section we first discuss the mechanism by which synchronized oscillatory
behavior is accomplished; then how this solves the problem that attention
faces; and, finally, whether attention-related gamma oscillation could be plau-
sibly regarded as representational.
Gamma oscillation depends crucially on the behavior of fast-spiking in-
hibitory interneurons (Pritchett et al. 2015; Fries 2009). Simplifying some-
what current computational models of the emergence of oscillatory behavior
(see, e.g., Börgers, Epstein, and Kopell 2008, for a fuller picture), the main
idea is that a stimulus presentation excites a group of interneurons, which in
turn inhibit a larger group of excitatory neurons in their vicinity. When the
inhibition wears out (after approximately 15ms, hence the gamma frequency
of the resulting rhythm, Pritchett et al. 2015, p. 254) there is a window of
opportunity for the activity of excitatory neurons, which in turn generate the
next cycle of inhibition by interneurons.
Attention is hypothesized to work roughly as follows: the stimulus at-
tended to by a population of neurons downstream, D, oscillating in the
gamma band, is the one encoded by the population upstream, U , also oscil-
lating and synchronized with D. The way in which this helps fix attention to
the stimulus encoded by U is by enhancing the effective connectivity (Friston
2011) between D and U (and impeding the connectivity between D and other
possible neuronal populations upstream). First, focusing on the downstream
neuron population, “input consistently arriving at high-gain phases benefits
from enhanced effective connectivity” (Ni et al. 2016, p. 240). Second, focus-
ing on the upstream population, “[presynaptic synchronization] . . . ensures
that a presynaptic activation pattern arrives at postsynaptic neurons in a
temporally coordinated manner” (Fries 2015), which in turn results in much
enhanced impact in postsynaptic neurons because of feedforward coincidence
1. Here, by “synchronized” we mean “in (delayed) coherence”, see Fries (2015).
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detection (Fries 2009). This is, in a nutshell, the mechanism that Fries calls
CTC.
Our main question is: are attention-related gamma oscillations represen-
tational? To be precise, the putative representational vehicle is
Vehicle: Populations U and D being synchronized in the gamma band.
Under the simplified analysis of representations we are working with (as
presented in section 2) a representation is, at least, a vehicle that mediates
between a sender (or producer) and a receiver (or consumer). Now, on the
one hand, it is possible to find a sender, or set of senders, for Vehicle. First,
for saliency-based attention, the most salient stimulus is the one that will
drive excitatory neurons most vigorously. This will kick off the process de-
scribed above, that results in gamma oscillation for these neurons, which in
turns “manages to entrain postsynaptic neurons and thereby achieves the in-
crease in input gain at the postsynaptic neurons.” (Fries 2015, p. 226). The
sender of the attentional vehicle, according to this picture, would be neural
(e.g., retinal) activity vigorous enough to entrain gamma oscillation. For top-
down attention, the CTC picture is somewhat less clear. Roughly, whatever
volitional processes that result in a mandate to attend to a certain spatial
region, feature or object would directly communicate with U (recall, this is
the population of upstream, presynaptic neurons), causing them to synchro-
nize, and thereby entraining D. The sender, according to this picture, would
be something like the neural correlate of an intention to focus one’s attention
on the feature encoded by D.
But, on the other hand, it is very unlikely that Vehicle have a receiver:
that D attends to U is not something that needs to be communicated to an-
other area of the brain for further treatment. There is no further component
that is sensitive to the synchronization and employs it to gather information
about some state of the world. Here neural oscillations enable a better com-
munication between two brain areas, but they are not supposed to represent
or carry information about any particular aspect of the world. Attentional
modulation of sensory processing is a very efficient way of optimizing the
brain’s limited computational budget, but the information that this opti-
mization might carry is of no use to other brain areas.2
2. At least in usual cases, leaving aside comparatively uncommon situations of self-
monitoring of attention (Harris et al. 2005).
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Note that our claim here is just that Vehicle (that is, the actual neural-
oscillatory implementation of attention) is not representational. We are not
discussing other phenomena in the vicinity, such as, for example, the in-
tention to focus our attention on some aspect of the visual field, which, as
suggested above, could plausibly trigger an attentional process in some cases.
The communication of this intention to neural population U could, for all we
know, constitute an imperative representation with a content along the lines
of “Attend to stimulus S!”. We will not discuss here this possible imperative
representation3 among other things because the philosophical treatment of
imperative representations is less mature than that of indicative ones. See
Butlin (2018) and Artiga (2014) for related discussions.4
What attention does falls squarely under channel management : given the
available channel capacity from early vision to the extrastriate cortex, infor-
mation relevant to current behavioral goals (top-down attention) or infor-
mation that might potentially inform new behavioral goals (saliency-based
attention) needs to be prioritized. Attention-related gamma oscillations play
a purely enabling, non-representational role.
4.2 Retrieval and encoding of cognitive maps
Our second example concerns place cells. Research on these neurons began
in the 1970s, when O’Keefe and Dostrovsy (1971) discovered that activity in
some cells of the rat’s hippocampus (specially in areas CA1 and CA3) were
not well correlated with significant events (such as food finding or lever press-
ing), but were instead specially sensitive to location. Subsequent research has
confirmed that these cells carry information about particular places and many
have taken this to suggest that rats possess a cognitive map of the environ-
ment (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978; Muller et al. 1994; McNaughton et al. 2006;
Hartley et al. 2017).
Cognitive maps must be stable enough that they can be re-used whenever
the rat needs to navigate the same space. At the same time, in certain circum-
stances (e.g. in new environments, or when familiar environments change in
significant ways) a new map needs to be created, a process called ‘remapping’
3. A representation which, by the way, would also be possibly mediated by gamma
synchrony, this time between the frontal eye field and V4 (Gregoriou et al. 2009). See
Baluch and Itti (2011) for a review of top-down influences in attention.
4. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this
point.
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(Muller and Kubie 1987). The exact circumstances that trigger remapping
are not well understood, but it has been extensively shown that this process
involves cells changing their place fields and establishing new connections
between them. In case of global or complete remapping, the cell’s new place
field does not bear any specific relationship with the previous one (Knierim
2003; Latuske et al. 2018).
The existence of remapping, however, raises a puzzle. When the rat needs
to orient itself in a familiar environment, action needs to be driven by the
information stored in the hippocampus and, when it finds itself in a new
environment or when the old environment changes in significant ways, the
new information needs to be stored. The problem, however, is that some of the
very same brain regions containing place cells (e.g. C3, and CA1) are involved
in both processes of encoding and retrieval (Leutgeb et al. 2005). How can a
system deal with these two different goals? How can the hippocampus encode
new information without interference from old memories, and retrieve an
old map without interference from incoming input? One possible mechanism
involves the use of neural oscillations.
The entorhinal cortex (EC) is one of the main extrahippocampal relays de-
livering new information to the hippocampus (Buhl and Whittington 2007).
In encoding a new map, activity in the EC and CA1 is synchronized, meaning
that cells in both regions tend to fire in-phase, whereas synaptic transmission
between CA3 and CA1 is weak, which prevents interference. In contrast, in
retrieval there is strong input from CA3 to CA1 and weak input from EC
(Hasselmo, Bodelón, and Wyble 2002; Montgomery and Buzsáki 2007). In a
nutshell, the idea is that, in encoding, oscillations are used in order to pro-
mote the transmission of information between extrahippocampal areas and
the hippocampus and inhibit interference from CA3, while, in retrieval, it is
information between CA3 and CA1 that is privileged (Hasselmo and Stern
2014; Colgin 2016). This seems, again, to be a clear example of communica-
tion through coherence.
Now, if this hypothesis is on the right track, what role are neural oscilla-
tions playing? As in the case of attention reviewed earlier, here synchroniza-
tion seems to to be the mechanism used for privileging the transmission of
certain kinds of information: it facilitates communication between two neu-
ronal assemblies and, at the same time, obstructs possible interferences from
other brain areas. Neural oscillations do not seem to provide any new con-
tent; they are just the mechanism that opens or closes the channels from two
areas that store preexisting information or relay new information.
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It is important to note that the fact that synchronized oscillation is estab-
lished between CA1 and EC (CA3) does carry information about the system’s
task currently being one of encoding (retrieval). It is sometimes suggested
that the kind of metasemantic account sketched in Section 2 has the un-
welcome consequence that most any informational connection will come out
representational. Encoding/retrieval in the hippocampus shows this to be
false: as no other part of the brain is receiving (or consuming, or decoding)
this information, the relevant vehicle does not qualify as a representation.
Again here, neural oscillations seem to play a merely enabling role.
4.3 Theta precession in remapping
Neural oscillations can also play a different sort of enabling role: sometimes
they are instrumental in building a certain representation, but they are not
themselves part of the actual representational vehicle. We offer theta preces-
sion as an example of this kind of enabling.
The mammal hippocampus presents a very strong pattern of oscillation
in the theta frequency band, around 3–10 Hz (Buzsáki 2002). There appears
to be a systematic timing relationship between the activities of single place
cells in CA1 or CA3 and this background theta rhythm: O’Keefe and Recce
(1993) found that as rats move through the place field corresponding to a
certain place cell, the phase of spike trains of this cell tend to change their
phase with respect to the background theta period: when the rat enters its
place field, a place cell starts firing at the end of the first theta cycle, and
subsequent spike trains progressively move forward, as the rat progresses
through the field. By the time the rats leaves the place field, bursts might
have advanced a whole cycle, i.e. almost 360◦, but never more, and most of
the time the phase precession spans at most about 180◦ (O’Keefe and Recce
1993; Maurer et al. 2006; Schmidt et al. 2009). This process is called ‘theta
precession’ (Figure 3).
Among the different proposals on offer about the role of theta precession
(Jensen and Lisman 2000; Hasselmo 2005; Huxter, Senior, and Allen 2008;
Jeewajee et al. 2014), another one of which we will discuss in Subsection 5.1,
we will here focus on the relation between precession and remapping (Skaggs
et al. 1996). Spatial representation in the hippocampus is not topological, in
the sense that two cells that are close together are not more likely to represent
adjacent areas than more distant cells. How can a stable map be formed
in such a structure? How can distant neurons come to steadily represent
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Figure 3: The colored area in b represents the place field of a partic-
ular hippocampal place cell when the rat crosses the field
represented in a. c shows that place cell spikes (shown in
red) precess against the theta oscillations: firings begin near
the peak and progressively move earlier in subsequent cy-
cles (from Huxter, Burgess, and O’Keefe 2003, by permis-
sion of Nature Publishing Group. This image/content is not
covered by the terms of the Creative Commons licence of
this publication. For permission to reuse, please contact the
rights holder.)
adjacent locations and how are their connections established? William Skaggs
and colleagues suggest that precession plays a key role.
In short, the suggestion runs as follows. When the rat initiates a process
of remapping, place cells lose they preferred place fields and gain new fields
that bear no predictable relationship to the old ones. Suppose that a rat
engages in remapping and in the new environment an A-cell fires when the
rat is in location A.5 Here precession is to be expected: the first spike train
will take place near the peak of the last gamma cycle within the first theta
cycle,6 but in subsequent theta cycles the firing pattern will take place at
5. In this paper we follow the convention of calling the cell that represents, e.g., location
A an “A-cell”; mutatis mutandis for other cells and their place fields.
6. For more on the relation between theta and gamma cycles see Lisman and Jensen
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earlier phases as the rat traverses the field. At some point the rat will enter
a new place field B and a B-cell (which might be located far away from any
A-cells) will become active. Now, due to precession these two cells will fire
in the order AB and, since place fields partly overlap, this pattern will be
repeated several times as the rat moves (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Explanation in the main text. (From Skaggs et al. 1996,
by permission of John Wiley and Sons, Inc. This im-
age/content is not covered by the terms of the Creative
Commons licence of this publication. For permission to
reuse, please contact the rights holder.)
More generally, as the rat traverses a sequence of places ABCDE, the
following pattern will emerge (vertical lines represent the beginning of a theta
cycle): . . . |ABC|ABC|BCD|BCD|CDE|CDE . . . . Note that spike trains in
the A-cell will systematically take place a bit earlier than spike trains in
the B-cell (or vice versa, if the rat is traveling in the contrary direction).
This short time span between the spikes of two cells that represent adjacent
locations A and B is crucial because it will help strengthen the connections
between A- and B-cells through long-term potentiation (LTP).7 It has been
suggested that LTP reinforces better the synaptic connections from A-cell to
B-cell when the A-cell fires slightly earlier in time than the B-cell (Larson
and Lynch 1989). If this is true, precession might facilitate LTP between
neurons that carry information about adjacent places and this might explain
(2013) and Section 5.3 below.
7. Long-term potentiation is a persistent strengthening of synapses caused by co-
activation patterns (Cooke and Bliss 2006).
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how maps can be formed in which cells located at a (relatively) long distance
from each other represent nearby places (Skaggs et al. 1996; Bechtel 2016).
Let us suppose that this explanation is on the right track. Do neural oscil-
lations play a representational role here? We lean towards a negative answer:
neural oscillations should be construed as a mechanism that enables the con-
struction of a map-like representation, but are not part of it. Certainly, the
stable time lag between spike bursts of A- and B-cells, afforded by their occu-
pying different phases in the gamma cycle, is sensitive to (carries information
about) the adjacency of the related place fields, but we suggest that this is
not enough to credit the underlying oscillations with a representational role.
There are two main reasons for this.
First, LTP occurs whenever there is a particular temporal delay between
the activity of two cells, independently of how this delay is produced. In
LTP, timing, not phase, is essential: firings of A- and B-cells need to be suf-
ficiently close in time and, for example, keeping phase-delay constant, LTP
will happen if the oscillation is sufficiently fast, but not if it is too slow.
Compare this with the cases of communication through coherence in atten-
tion reviewed above: there, persistently rhythmic, coincident activity (and
not merely a certain time lag) seemed to play an essential role in upstream
neurons entraining downstream activity. The second reason is that, in this
mechanism, there does not seem to be any receiver sensitive to oscillations as
such. There is no internal downstream mechanism sensing this phase delay
and using it go gain information that could be used in some computational
process.
5 Representational oscillations
So far we have discussed cases in which neural oscillations play a role in
bringing about representational phenomena without being representations
themselves, but rather partly constituting the communicative scaffolding nec-
essary for representations to emerge. In this section we present cases in which
neural oscillations do seem to play a properly representational role.
5.1 Theta precession in prediction
Apart from its contribution to remapping, theta precession plays a second
role that might qualify as genuinely representational. In their seminal paper,
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O’Keefe and Recce (1993) found that place cells tend to fire more vigor-
ously in earlier phases of the background theta wave, as the rat approaches
the center of their place field. In fact, they observed that the phase of the
background theta wave at which place-cell activity is maximal appears to
correlate much better with the exact location of the rat within the place field
than with the time it has spent in it, or its velocity. Furthermore, in normal
conditions this precession (i.e., the phenomenon by which the phase of pre-
dominant place-cell activity moves towards the beginning of the theta wave)
vanishes when the rat is in the running wheel (Czurko et al. 1999; Hirase
et al. 1999), which lends support to the idea that the relevant connection is
not with its speed or the time it has spent in a place field, but with its lo-
cation. As a result, some have suggested that theta phase is used to provide
a more fine-grained representation of location: whereas activity in a given
place cell indicates the broad area in which the rats finds itself (this would
be rate coding), the degree of precession carries information about the rat’s
location within the place field (and this would be phase coding). Jensen and
Lisman (2000) provided further support for this hypothesis, when they used
the activity recorded in 38 pyramidal cells to pinpoint the rats’ place within
a linear track, and showed that by including phase information they could
improve the accuracy by 43% (p. 2607). They were able to predict the rat’s
position within a 2-meter track with a precision of 3 cm.
Other, more recent work interprets the same results in a slightly differ-
ent way: instead of taking them to support the idea that phase codes for
fine-grained location information within one and the same place field, John
Lisman and colleagues have claimed that phase coding is actually used to
make predictions about which place field the rat is moving towards (Lisman
and Redish 2009a; Lisman and Jensen 2013). This is, in a sense, a different
gloss on the same main idea: you can think of place fields as being compar-
atively big, and therefore interpret theta phase as coding for location within
that field; or you can think of place fields as comparatively smaller, and then
think of theta phase as predicting which place field the rate will be visiting
next. Indeed, an important feature of the more recent Lisman and colleagues
model is that “the ‘true place field’ . . . is taken to be approximately one-
seventh of the apparent place field (the entire field where rate is elevated)”
(Lisman and Redish 2009b, p. 1194). Below, though, we will review empirical
data that seems to support the prediction interpretation as more than a mere
gloss. It is also possible that there be both downstream consumers for this
phase-coded information that use it as an aid to prediction or as fine-grained
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information about location (Colgin 2016, p. 245; Maurer and McNaughton
2007, p. 325f). In the remainder of this section we will stick to prediction.
The predictive role relies on the fact that neural oscillations at different
frequencies can be nested, with faster oscillations locked to concrete phases
of the slower ones. In particular, within a single theta cycle (called a ‘sweep’),
there can be between 5 and 14 gamma cycles (Lisman and Redish 2009a, p.
1194).8 In the current context, this means that a theta sweep accommodates
a sequence of 5 to 14 place-cell gamma bursts. Lisman and colleagues’ idea
is that this sequence is used for prediction: the order in which place cells fire
within a single theta cycle corresponds to the order in which the rat expects
to visit their place fields.
Let us consider a particular example. Suppose A, B, C, D, E, F and G
are the different sections of a path that leads to a certain goal. When the rat
is in A, the A-, B-, C-, D-, E-, F- and G-cells will fire within a single theta
cycle, in this order. The A-cell firing early in the theta cycle represents that
the rat is in A. In contrast, the G-cell firing at the end of the cycle represents
that the rat is moving towards G. In other words, the order in which cells
fire within a sweep represents the location of their place field with respect to
each other. A place cell firing early in the theta cycle represents the actual
location, whereas firings in later phases of the cycle predict future positions
(Jensen and Lisman 1996).
Different kinds of evidence have been presented in support of this hy-
pothesis. First of all, the postulated predictive role coheres very well with
accounts of hippocampal memory (Jensen and Lisman 1996; Lenck-Santini,
Fenton, and Muller 2008): the idea being that prediction relies on the hip-
pocampus operating in “recall mode” (Jensen and Lisman 1996). There is
also more direct evidence for a predictive role: as the rat familiarizes itself
with a certain environment, it should be able to predict its future location
earlier; and this is indeed what is observed: as rats becomes more famil-
iar with an environment, more gamma cycles are nested within every theta
cycle—indicating that prediction starts earlier (Jensen and Lisman 1996).
There is also evidence that rats make predictions about future locations be-
fore choosing a path, by relying on this phase-coded information. Johnson
and Redish (2007) showed that, at bifurcation points in a T-maze, theta
sweeps go, successively, through the sequence of place fields corresponding
to both arms, which suggests that the rat evaluates available possibilities in
8. “Seven to nine”, according to Buzsáki (2010, p. 370).
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Figure 5: From Lisman and Redish (2009a, p. 1196, by permission of
The Royal Society. This image/content is not covered by
the terms of the Creative Commons licence of this publi-
cation. For permission to reuse, please contact the rights
holder.)
advance of deciding.
Let us suppose that this phase-coding-as-prediction hypothesis is correct:
a G-cell firing at the beginning of the theta cycle represents that the rat is
in G, whereas the very same pattern of activity at late stages of the theta
cycle would instead represent that the rat is heading towards G. In this case,
it seems that oscillations-involving states such as, e.g., Vehicle below satisfy
all the requirements for qualifying as representational states:
Vehicle: G-cells firing early in the theta cycle.
On the one hand, it is very plausible that Vehicle has a sender—that
is, an internal mechanism that generates it in response to location-related
worldly states of affairs.9 There are two main current hypotheses about this
mechanism: that it relies on two different oscillators, and that it emerges
from asymmetric connections among place cells (Maurer and McNaughton
2007). Hybrid models have also been formulated. But our understanding of
9. Or perhaps we should think of this case as involving two senders: one in charge of
the actual place cell that gets activated, and another in charge of the phase in which
this activation happens. As far as we know, our current understanding of the relevant
mechanistic details does not allow us to adjudicate this question.
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this mechanism is still in flux and, as Maurer and McNaughton note in their
review, it might “turn out to be extraordinary” (p. 332).10
Vehicle also has a receiver, as it makes a clear functional difference down-
stream (again, assuming that the prediction hypothesis is correct): distin-
guishing a representation of the actual location from a representation of a
future location the rat will be in. This is made most vivid in the role they
seem to play in navigation-related decision making (see above.) We conclude
that here neural oscillations appear to play a representation-constitutive role,
rather than just an enabling role. What is their representational content? The
most plausible reading, as we have argued, is that a late theta phase modifies
a place-cell representation: G-cell firing in early theta-phases represents that
the rat already is in G, whereas G-cell firing in late theta-phases represents
that the rat is moving toward G.
It could be objected that, in fact, it is just G-cell firings that are properly
representational, with the background theta oscillation merely providing a
syntactic scaffolding. After all, it is only place cell firings, not oscillations,
that carry the relevant information about present and future locations. But
theta phase does not have a merely syntactical role. Early (late) phases of
the theta wave have something akin to predicative content:
λx{I am currently at (moving towards) x}
Another possible deflationary understanding of the role theta phase plays
is that it is merely contextual: its contribution to the meaning of Vehicle
would be analogous to the contribution time makes to an utterance such as
‘Whiskers is at G now ’. While the time at which the utterance is made sup-
plies the reference for “now”, this is compatible with refraining from claiming
that time is literally part of the representation. But this is not a good model
for the role theta phases play: time contributes itself to the meaning of “now”,
but theta phases are not themselves part of the content—they stand in for
times, like representations do.
Finally, phase differences are as information-carrying as firing rates: if we
want to infer where the rat currently is from hippocampal activity, simply
10. The asymmetric-connectivity model is related to the facilitation of long-term potenti-
ation discussed in Subsection 4.3. As far as we are aware, the particular details about how
the look-ahead role can be made compatible with the remapping role are still unknown.
In any event, the provisional consensus appears to be that both roles are compatible (cf.
Colgin 2016).
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focusing on the rate of activation of place cells will not do. We need to take
into account the phase of activation as well.11
5.2 Feature Binding
One of the first modern discussions of the role that synchrony plays in brain
function is von der Malsburg (1981). Here, von der Malsburg suggests that
the “correlation between two cellular signals” should be defined “in terms
of synchrony and asynchrony between spike trains” (we are citing from the
4th edition of this paper, von der Malsburg 1994, p. 110). Von der Mals-
burg presents his synchronicity-based “correlation theory” of brain function
as a way of solving, among others, the problem of detecting specific percep-
tual patterns—among the very many possible combinations of colors, shapes,
movement, etc. that could make up a visual scene. Postulating the existence
of a set of specialized units that differentially respond to each such pattern
(the variously called cardinal, gnostic, pontifical or grandmother cells, see
Quiroga 2013), he claims, will not do, as “the number of [such units] required
would . . . be forbidding” (von der Malsburg 1994, p. 101). This is known as
the problem of combinatorial explosion: if we are to keep track of n simulta-
neous features (color, shape, etc.), each of which could take m values (blue,
yellow, square, etc.), we would need mn grandmother cells. Synchronization
between cells, on the other hand, can result in dynamically created “synap-
tic networks”, in which individual cells respond to rather simple stimuli, but
which collectively function as “complex composite feature detectors” (p. 112).
Another important early theory of brain function which predicts a role
for synchrony in feature binding along these lines is Grossberg’s Adaptive
Resonance Theory [ART]. In a recent review of ART, Grossberg states that
Coherent binding of the attended features to the category give
them a meaning as a context-sensitive “event” rather than as
just isolated pixels. Such coherent states between distributed fea-
tures and symbolic categories are often expressed dynamically
as synchronously oscillating activations across the bound cells
. . . (Grossberg 2013, p. 9)
This “coherence between distributed features and symbolic categories” is
what we would now call feature binding (of the former features into an object
conceptualized under the latter symbolic category).
11. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on these points.
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Many experimental results support these ideas: Gray et al. (1989) fa-
mously demonstrated that oscillatory responses were evoked by stimuli which
showed coherent motion, but not by stimuli which moved in opposite direc-
tions (Gray et al. 1989; Gray et al. 1990, p. 335). That is: synchronous activity
marks the presence of coherent motion, which (as Gestalt theorists suggested)
is in its turn evidence that the two stimuli in question are not in fact separate
entities, but belong to one and the same object. Kreiter and Singer (1996)
showed that two cells with overlapping receptive fields, but such that each
of them is tuned to a different direction of movement, can be driven to fire
in synchrony by the movement of a single bar, yet not by two bars each one
moving in the preferred direction of one cell—again here, synchronization
goes with co-boundedness, even trumping the tuning features of individual
neurons. Synchronization appears to be responsive to other Gestalt-grouping
principles as well, besides coherent motion (Singer and Gray 1995; Engel et
al. 1992; Gray 1999). Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand (1999) review much other
relevant evidence. Modeling work also supports the link between oscillations
and feature binding (Eckhorn et al. 1990) and suggests that synchroniza-
tion can be sufficiently fast in long-range interactions (Yazdanbakhsh and
Grossberg 2004).
The most ambitious contemporary version of this binding by synchrony
[BBS] hypothesis claims that synchrony is the main code for feature binding.
This seems to be the position taken by proponents of the temporal binding
model (Engel and Singer 2001; Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001, and papers
cited therein), who claim that “neural synchrony . . . is crucial for object rep-
resentation” (Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001, p. 706). There are good reasons
(both theoretical (Shadlen and Movshon 1999; Di Lollo 2012)12 and empir-
ical (Palanca and DeAngelis 2005)) to think that synchrony is not the only
feature-binding code. Still, the results discussed above and many others (in-
cluding ones by Palanca and DeAngelis in the critical paper just cited) sug-
gest that it does make a contribution to representing the fact that different
features are co-bound to the same object (cf. Hommel 2004, Box 1).
Let us assume that this putative contribution takes the following form:
“the mechanism that evaluates temporal relations among responses for per-
ceptual grouping interprets synchronous responses as related and segregates
12. Di Lollo is sceptical about the very existence of a feature-binding problem. He defends
that something like gnostic cells are actually available in the brain, but doesn’t explicitly
discuss how combinatorial explosion is therefore dealt with.
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them from responses that are temporally offset.” (Singer 1999, p. 51) where,
as we have just discussed, “interprets” should not be taken to mean that
synchronicity determines the status of responses as related or unrelated,
but rather that it provides evidence for it, possibly to be combined with
other mechanisms such as, e.g., task-dependent alterations in neural tuning
(Gilbert and Li 2013, p. 5). Should we interpret this less ambitious version
of BBS as vindicating a representational role for synchrony?
In a nutshell, the hypothesis is that synchronous activity between two
populations that code for two different perceptual features would represent
that these features are co-bound. Again, we unpack this idea by trying to find
occupants for the different roles in our metasemantic sketch. First, there is a
plausible occupant for the role of representational vehicle:
Vehicle: A population of neurons P1 (that encodes a perceptual feature F1)
and another population P2, (that encodes a perceptual feature F2) firing
in synchrony.13
Now, is there a plausible sender/encoder for Vehicle? What this encoder
has to do is to subsume populations P1 and P2 into a larger coherent assembly,
as a reaction to the fact that onset and offset of activity in P1 and P2 is more
or less simultaneous (which in turn is explained by features F1 and F2 being
actually co-bound in the world, and therefore appearing and disappearing
more or less simultaneously).
There are at least two goals that this encoder must meet. First, note that
the fact that F1 and F2 are reliably co-instantiated is not the same as, nor
sufficient for, synchrony. Co-instantiation is indeed sufficient for sameness
of onset and end of firing, but not for the fact that, during the duration
of the firing episode, this firing is synchronized, which it is, “over periods
ranging from tens to thousands of milliseconds” (Gray 1999, p. 38), more-
over showing sophisticated oscillatory structure (Singer and Gray 1995, p.
1094). Second, this synchronic firing must start quickly and reliably after
stimulus onset if it is to be an ecologically viable way of signaling feature
boundedness. This job description is far from computationally trivial, and it
13. Shouldn’t the vehicle be just the coinstantiation of P1 and P2 firings, rather than
full-blown synchrony? Not according to the defenders of the BBS hypothesis: synchrony
(i.e., rhythmic, congruent activity), and not mere coinstantiation, is necessary to entrain
postsynaptic activity in a sufficiently vigorous way (Fries 2015; Engel, Fries, and Singer
2001, p. 705).
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is met by a rather specific pattern of lateral interconnections in the relevant
neuronal population, with the right mix of excitation and inhibition (Fries
2015; Yazdanbakhsh and Grossberg 2004, see Section 4.1 above). This kind
of network architecture is a good candidate for our sender/encoder.
There is also a plausible receiver for Vehicle: the whole point of binding
by synchrony is that dynamic assemblies formed by synchronized neurons are
treated as a unit. One often proposed mechanism in this connection is that
coincidence-sensitive neurons (Engel and Singer 2001, p. 18; Abeles 1982;
König, Engel, and Singer 1996) would be specially driven by neurons fir-
ing synchronously (see Fries 2015, on effective connectivity). We will discuss
“reader-classifiers” of these neuronal assemblies in more detail in Subsec-
tion 5.3.
It seems, thus, that in the case of BBS all of the links in our metase-
mantic sketch have a plausible occupant. We therefore tentatively conclude
that Vehicle is a representation. Note that here synchrony is not merely an
enabling mechanism: synchronized oscillations are a constitutive part of the
representational vehicle. Moreover, and more importantly, these same oscil-
lations are directly causally involved in the decoding behavior. That is, it is
by virtue of its oscillatory profile that Vehicle means what it means.
5.3 Sequences
An impressive body of work associated mainly (but not only) with György
Buzsáki’s lab (Buzsáki 2006; 2010; Buzsáki and Watson 2012, among many
others) has aimed at uncovering “syntactical” units in brain processing: how
does the brain go about providing vehicles over which computations can be
performed? As we will see, neural oscillations play an essential role in the
construction of these various syntactical units. It will turn out, though, that
there is some, perhaps ineliminable, indeterminacy between taking some cases
of neural activity as constituting one such unit (e.g., a “neural word”) or as
a process of computation of one unit from another. In our framework, this
will translate to indeterminacy in their status as properly representational.
Constructing these vehicles is a difficult task, if only because it involves
arbitrating between two desiderata that pull in different directions. First,
the repertoire of available vehicles needs to be sensitive enough: it should
be possible to token, reliably, different vehicles in the presence of different,
but similar, external conditions. Brains need to keep track of fine-grained
differences in external events (say, in the velocity of looming or receding ob-
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jects, Maier et al. 2004) and this requires provisioning a sufficient number of
different vehicles to stand in for each member in a sufficiently fine-grained
partition of such events (say, for a sufficiently fine-grained range of differ-
ent looming velocities). Note that this sensitivity requirement is not met by
simply generating states that count as different under some third-personal
criterion: it must be possible for these different states to make a difference
to the system itself—they must be possibly treated as different downstream.
Second, this repertoire needs to be robust enough: the vehicles in question
need to be somehow resistant to the very noisy environment in which they
are tokened (see Faisal, Selen, and Wolpert 2008, for a review of noise in the
brain). Sensitivity and robustness are in tension: sensitive processing involves
tokening noticeably different vehicles in response to very similar world states;
yet, robust processing involves preventing ambient noise from conflating the
processing trajectories of the vehicles that are triggered by those world states.
As we are about to see, it has been suggested that neural oscillations play
an important role in solving this conundrum.
Buzsáki and colleagues have claimed that the fundamental “syntactical”
units in brain processing (that is to say, the fundamental unit in the construc-
tion of vehicles) is not the single neuron but the cell assembly : “a collection
of neurons that come together . . . to produce a composite downstream effect
that cannot be produced by single neurons alone” (Buzsáki 2010, p. 364, recall
that von der Malsburg uses a very similar expression). Because the existence
of a cell assembly depends on the existence of these “composite downstream
effects”, there must be a downstream “reader-classifier” that treats the as-
sembly as a functional unit (ibid.). According to Buzsáki, the most basic
assembly reader-classifier in the brain is the integration of presynaptic ac-
tivity : the process whereby a certain neuron treats presynaptic events (say,
action potentials coming from different presynaptic neurons at slightly differ-
ent times) as a unit. How far apart from each other these events can be and
still be treated as a single whole depends on the so-called membrane time
constant τ (ibid.) but, in general, the closer in time those events are, the
most likely it will be that they will be treated as a unit. Obviously, a reader-
classifier such as this one, that mainly detect coincidences in presynaptic
activity, will greatly benefit from synchronized activity upstream. This is the
first place where neural oscillations play a role in the generation of vehicles:
locking presynaptic firings to concrete phases of an oscillation cycle leads to
postsynaptic neurons treating each such phase-locked collection of firings as
a functional unit.
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These cell assemblies should be thought of as the phonemes (or perhaps
letters) of the neural syntax. One step up in the Buzsákian hierarchy of
vehicles we find neural words, made up of “sequences” of these assemblies,
quickly following one another through the duration of a (typically gamma)
cycle (ibid., p. 365). E.g., we can think of a neural word as assemblies A, B,
C, D succeeding one another through a gamma cycle (each, say, occupying 90
degrees of the full 360 degrees in a cycle). The sequence consisting of assem-
blies A, C, D, B would constitute a different word, possibly discharging an
entirely different processing role. Again, neural words will only be real insofar
as some entity downstream treats them as a unit: for example, mechanisms
with a longer integration window than the membrane time constant, such
as NMDA or GABAe receptors (ibid., p. 366). A more important, and more
general, class of reader-classifiers with different integration windows is again
provided by neural oscillations (ibid.). From the point of view of electronics,
neural oscillations are relaxation oscillators (Wang 1999): this kind of circuit
(which is used, for example, in the blinking turn signals of cars) works by
periodically charging and discharging a capacitor (a storage of electrical en-
ergy); when the capacitor reaches a certain threshold, the oscillator is “reset”.
The concept of neural word relies on two features of relaxation oscillators:
first, the phase during which the capacitor is being charged naturally corre-
sponds to an integrator window (Buzsáki 2010, p. 366)—recall that this is
just a period during which incoming neural activity is treated as an undifer-
entiated whole. Second, the oscillator “reset” acts as a natural gap between
different neural words.
There is ample empirical evidence of the existence of neural words, under-
stood along those lines. For example, Jones et al. (2007) show how neurons
in the gustatory cortex of rats go through four different sequences, each com-
prised of four different states, whenever the rat is exposed to sweet, bitter,
sour or salty flavors, respectively. The four states that are part of the se-
quences are different for different flavors, but always the same within each
flavor (see figure 6). Laurent (2002, p. 886) similarly reports population-
level representations in the antennal lobe of insects and the olfactory bulb
of mammals that are “dynamic, carried by an assembly of neurons . . . that
evolves in a stimulus-specific manner over time”. In sections 4.3 and 5.1 we
have reviewed in detail theta sweeps in the hippocampus, which provides yet
another important example of assembly sequence.
Further syntactic structure is provided by nested oscillatory rhythms: for
example, the number of assemblies that fit in a theta cycle has consequences
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Figure 6: Neural words in the gustatory cortex. From Jones et
al. (2007), by permission of The National Academy of Sci-
ences, U.S.A. This image/content is not covered by the
terms of the Creative Commons licence of this publication.
For permission to reuse, please contact the rights holder.
Copyright (2007) National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.
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for the “memory ‘buffer’ of the gamma-nested theta-cycle” (ibid.). More gen-
erally, “[theta-gamma] oscillations form a code for representing multiple items
in an ordered way.” (Lisman and Jensen 2013, p. 1002)
Now, how do neural vehicles constructed out of these syntactic building
blocks trade off sensitivity and robustness? First of all, reader-classifiers will
help with robustness by failing to distinguish between different sequences of
events (say, different sets of arrival times of presynactic activities) as long as
they fall within the same activation window—e.g., neuron 1 firing now and
neurons 2 and 3 firing in the next 5ms will be indistinguishable from neuron
3 firing now and neurons 1 and 2 firing in the next 5ms.14 As for sensitivity,
the production of sequences might be such that initially minute differences in
input are taken, as more evidence comes in, into rapidly divergent trajecto-
ries corresponding to different sequences that are much easier to distinguish:
those initially minute differences, for example, might result in two different
sequences with an overlapping initial part, as in the ABCD / ACBD example
above (Harvey, Coen, and Tank 2012).
The most straightforward way to think of these neural words is as repre-
sentational vehicles: they are hypothesized to solve a problem (the sensitivity
/ robustness tradeoff) that is precisely the kind of problem a representational
system in a noisy environment would face. Furthermore, the empirical evi-
dence for neural words links them in every case to concrete representational
roles (the representation of flavors in Jones et al. (2007), odorants in Laurent
(2002), or paths to be taken in space in Jensen and Lisman (1996)).
Still, closer examination of the available evidence, and the attitude of
researchers toward that evidence, reveals that this representational reading
is not without problems. First, note that the mechanisms through which,
we suggested, sensitivity and robustness are accommodated by neural words
are somewhat at odds with one another: robustness depended on a reader-
classifier with a large enough activation window that it may be able to take
the full neural word in as a unified whole; while sensitivity depended on
neural words being interpreted as diverging trajectories—crucially, their di-
achronic unfolding, and their responsiveness to incoming evidence that co-
heres with the trajectory chosen, is part of what makes them robust. Indeed,
many researchers are skeptical that sequences have readers of their own. So,
for example, according to Lauren Jones and colleagues, “[c]oherent state se-
14. This is just a straightforward example of what information theorists call channel
coding, or error correction (MacKay 2003).
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quences . . . probably do not represent pure ‘sensory codes’ to be interpreted by
downstream ‘grandmother neurons’ ” Jones et al. (2007, p. 18776, emphasis
added). According to these researchers, the sequences we see in sensory corti-
cal ensembles should be interpreted, not as pure codes, but as computations
of motor codes from purely sensory ones.
Laurent (2002), on the other hand, claims that sequences of assemblies
do play a role in generating a “ large coding space in which to spread repre-
sentation clusters” (ibid., p. 885f, emphasis added). While this is one of the
main points of his paper, highlighted in abstract and conclusions, Laurent
also warns that, conceivably, “slow temporal patterns, although crucial for
the separation of representations, are never actually decoded as such. More
generally, the creation of spatiotemporal representations by circuit dynam-
ics might be a transient phase in signal processing, used simply to spread
out those representations in a larger coding space and to facilitate decoding”
(ibid., p. 891, emphasis added). That is, it is not clear that the olfaction-
related neural sequences in insects and mammals that Laurent is interested
in have receivers—i.e., are pure sensory codes. Rather, they would amount
to encoding stages along which representational vehicles are progressively
optimized.
This hybrid (part code, part encoding process) nature of spatio-temporal
sequences is fleshed out most clearly by Harvey, Coen, and Tank (2012).
They show that an ideal observer is able to predict behavioral choices in
mice from spatio-temporal neural sequences but not from the synchronic
behavior of neuronal populations (see also Yuste 2015, p. 492). The model
proposed by Harvey and colleagues is one in which incoming sensory informa-
tion initiates a (firstly decision-agnostic) sequence which gets progressively
decision-specific as incoming information modifies it. When the sequence
overlaps sufficiently with a decision-specific trajectory, this corresponds to
the personal-level state of the mouse having decided. The subsequent, en-
dogenously generated unfolding of the decision-specific sequence corresponds
to the personal-level state of keeping the decision in mind.
The upshot of this discussion is that, while very prominent models of brain
function accord an important role to neural oscillations in the generation of
representational vehicles, there is some vacillation in the literature regard-
ing what counts as code (of incoming sensory information); what counts as
computation (of decisions from sensory information); and what counts as en-
coding processes (whereby sensory codes gets optimized into decision codes).
This indeterminacy between merely enabling and properly representational
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status for neural-sequence-related oscillations will perhaps be remedied as
our knowledge of brain processing improves; perhaps it is ineliminable.
6 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to examine whether neural oscillations in
the brain actually are representations. As we have seen, whether they do
often depends on rather intricate facts about the relevant mechanisms where
they participate, and the role they play in these mechanisms. We offer this
to philosophers as a cautionary tale: representational status, like the devil,
is often in the detail.
But we can also glean a few big-picture lessons from the foregoing discus-
sion. First, our results shows that the core metaphysical theory of content
put forward in Section 2 is a useful tool for understanding and modelling neu-
ral representations. It suggests important questions, and provides theoretical
instruments with which to answer them.
Secondly, the discussion of case studies revealed that neural oscillations
can play at least two different roles, enabling and properly representational, in
the implementation of representations in the brain. This distinction is a result
of the careful consideration of specific cases, rather than a pre-conceived anal-
ysis. We hypothesize that this distinction will also apply to the mechanisms
subserving other representational phenomena; and that it can potentially be
extended by considering other roles that cognitive processes can play that are
not representational, but are defined in relation to properly representational
states.
Thirdly, following a recent call for multi-level analysis (Craver 2007;
Boone and Piccinini 2016), our results show that paying attention to imple-
mentational details is relevant for understanding higher-order levels. Even
though ‘representation’ is a functional category, considering which specific
brain structure actually play a representational role can help us vindicate a
particular analysis of the nature of representation and distinguishes different
non-representational roles brain states can play, among others.
Finally, against recent suggestions to the contrary, we argued that low-
level processes can qualify as representational. Furthermore, this result has
not been obtained by defining representation so cheaply that just anything
can count as such, since we have identified some processes employing os-
cillations in which they fail to play a representational role (e.g. attention,
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retrieval and encoding). The results of this paper support the idea that rep-
resentations can be found all the way down without trivializing this notion.
This provides some vindication for naturalistic theories of representation.15
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